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Administrative Justice and the Legacy of Executive Devolution: 
Establishing a Tribunals System for Wales  
 
Sarah Nason* and Huw Pritchard*  
 
The Welsh model of tribunals is distinctive in light of Wales’ political, constitutional and legal 
development. In particular its journey from a historically sophisticated legal code, to being 
England’s first colony, becoming the often junior partner in a single England and Wales legal 
jurisdiction. Despite continuation of the combined legal jurisdiction, Wales has responsibilities 
for administrative justice, and an increasingly systematised approach to its set of devolved 
tribunals. This has been reinforced by recent legislation, including the statutory establishment 
of a President of Welsh Tribunals. The Tribunals within the President’s remit are managed by 
devolved Welsh Government, an administrative set up seen by some as the nucleus containing 
the DNA not only for a fully devolved Welsh tribunals system, but potentially for a Welsh 
courts and tribunals service.1  
 During replication DNA unwinds so that its instructions can be read and copied, here 
we read the main strands of DNA within the Welsh tribunal system, examining how complete 
they might be and what gaps remain to be filled. These strands include; administrative justice 
principles, structure and administration, independence, procedures and practices, leadership, 
confidence and standards, political will, coherent policy and longer-term arrangements for 
oversight. Before examining each strand, we first draw attention to the constitutional context 
of Wales and how this has informed its unique administrative justice characteristics. Finally, 
we compare the Welsh model of administrative justice and tribunals to some other jurisdictions, 
focusing on possible strengths, weaknesses and future directions.  
 
Constitutional Development  
 
The codified native Welsh laws of the 10th Century maintained a clear distinction between 
Welsh and English laws that remained even after the Norman conquest in 1066. This was 
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gradually challenged by the growing power of English Kings and in 1282, following the death 
of the ‘last Prince of Wales’, Edward I imposed aspects of English common law in Wales. In 
1536 Henry VIII extended the English legal system over the whole of Wales. Although Wales 
retained a different structure of courts and circuits until the Judicature Act 1830, it was the 
English legal jurisdiction that operated in Wales,2 a legacy underpinning the protracted 
devolution of legislative powers to Wales.3  
The Government of Wales Act 1998 introduced a model of ‘executive devolution’ that 
established a National Assembly for Wales (the ‘Assembly’) as a body corporate with 
subordinate law-making powers. This was structured on a conferred powers model where 
specific executive powers were transferred from the UK Government to the Assembly.  
The body corporate, or so-called ‘double yolker’ egg model, however, did not reflect a 
traditional Westminster conception of separation of powers between executive and legislative 
branches. After an informal separation, the Government of Wales Act 2006 (GoWA) officially 
divided the Assembly and the Welsh Assembly Government (later renamed the Welsh 
Government)4. GoWA gave the reformed Assembly powers to enact laws, known as Measures, 
in specific fields.5 Measures had the same status as primary legislation but were limited by the 
conferred powers model. Full primary legislative powers were transferred in areas of devolved 
Welsh competence following a 2011 referendum, but the settlement remained one of conferred 
powers and Westminster continued to be Wales’ other Parliament. 
The legal problems of two legislatures within a single legal jurisdiction have since been 
dodged by ‘constitutional sleight of hand’.6 The GoWA principle of ‘apply and extend’ 
provides that Assembly laws apply only in Wales but extend over England and Wales. This 
allows courts in England to interpret Welsh law and for the unified legal system to operate 
largely unaltered.  
The conferred powers model has however proved unsustainable, with the 2014 
Commission on Devolution in Wales (the Silk Commission) recommending that Welsh 
devolution be brought into line with the reserved powers approach operating in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The Silk Commission concluded some aspects of justice could be devolved 
immediately, but that devolution of traditional justice institutions, such as courts and the 
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judiciary, would take at least a decade.7 However, as concerns administrative justice it 
recommended that immediate progress could be made by reforming administration of the 
devolved Welsh tribunals.8  
Following a Supreme Court case,9 which interpreted conferred powers as wider than 
the UK Government had anticipated, a St David’s Day White Paper set out plans for a reserved 
powers model.10 However, the UK Government’s politicised approach to reservations allowed 
the devolution of some subject matters to be vetoed without full justification. Consequently, 
‘justice’ was not seen as a matter for devolution, except, that is, for statutory recognition of 
Welsh Tribunals. The subsequent Wales Act 2017 has been criticised for its complex 
framework of general reservations, specific reservations, and exceptions to reservations.11 
Commentators have described it as “carrying the seeds of its own destruction”.12 Nevertheless, 
administrative justice is an area where the UK Government has admitted that there are, and 
could legitimately continue to be, differences between justice in England and justice in Wales. 
For example, the history of tribunals in Wales operating under some degree of devolved 
structure goes back more than 50 years. The oldest Welsh Tribunal is the Agricultural Land 
Tribunal Wales created by the Agriculture Act 1947. Various other tribunals have since been 
established at different stages of devolution, meaning that their statutory basis and regulation 
is governed by multiple sources of UK, England and Wales, and Wales only primary and 
secondary legislation.  
The Wales Act 2017 gives statutory recognition to seven specific tribunals; Agricultural 
Land, Mental Health, Rent Assessment Committees, the Special Educational Needs Tribunal 
for Wales, appeals about the registration of school inspectors, the Adjudication Panel for Wales 
and the Welsh Language Tribunal. Further tribunals can be designated as Welsh Tribunals by 
a UK Order in Council.  
The 2017 Act also creates the role of President of Welsh Tribunals. The President is 
tasked to ensure that Welsh Tribunals are accessible, fair, efficient, that their members have 
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sufficient expertise, and to have regard to “the need to develop innovative methods of resolving 
disputes”.13 The Act additionally provides for ‘cross-deployment’ of judges between the 
different Welsh Tribunals (with consent of the President).14 
We discuss some practical implications of these reforms, but politically speaking the 
current Welsh Government takes the view that they do not go far enough in terms of an 
evolving Welsh justice system. The Government has argued that the reservation of large 
aspects of responsibility for the administration of justice, and the single legal jurisdiction of 
England and Wales, no longer serves the needs of the people of Wales, with the Counsel 
General for Wales stating: 
 
A process has begun to create a distinct legal infrastructure for Wales. This is a process 
that won’t stop. The process of making laws for Wales won’t stop, the divergence in 
laws between Wales and England won’t stop. The creation of a Welsh legal jurisdiction 
and the devolution of the justice system is inevitable.15 
 
Whether or not separation is indeed inevitable, the process of moving to a reserved powers 
model has exposed both the constitutional complexity caused by a growing body of divergent 
laws, but also the practical challenges of operating different systems of public administration 
within a single legal structure. Research has begun to expose ‘jagged edges’ in the devolution 
settlement; caused by the disconnect between devolved policy areas and a largely reserved 
justice system in the traditional sense of courts and legal services.16 New statutory Welsh public 
law duties are more often than not enforced through the reserved England and Wales courts. 
Here Wales has limited sway over time set aside to create Wales-specific Civil Procedure 
Rules, a matter which has delayed the bringing into force of key legislation. Wales also has no 
real say over legal aid policies to support litigants. 
That said, it would be wrong to conclude that apparent weaknesses in Welsh 
administrative justice stem entirely from external factors. Partially due to inexperience (the 
comparative youth of the Assembly and Welsh Government) and partially due to ideology, 
Welsh political institutions have tended to conflate administrative justice with public 
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administration. Our examples below show that this has led to challenges in complying with 
core constitutional principles of judicial independence and separation of powers.  
Cognisant of growing concerns around ‘jagged edges’, the Welsh Government 
established a Commission on Justice in Wales under the chairmanship of Lord Thomas of 
Cwmgiedd. It had a wide remit to review the operation of the justice system in Wales, setting 
a long-term vision.17 The Commission reported on 24 October 2019, with its headline 
recommendation being a call for the full legislative and executive devolution of responsibility 
for justice accompanied by a transfer of financial resources.18 It also recommended that the law 
applicable in Wales should be formally identified as the law of Wales, distinct from the law of 
England. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the UK Ministry of Justice’s immediate response was to 
stress its belief that a single legal jurisdiction remains the most effective way to deliver justice 
across England and Wales. Regardless of the MoJ’s reaction, the Commission Report is full of 
‘ground-up’ recommendations that address more immediate challenges of delivering justice in 
Wales, particularly administrative justice, for the people of Wales. 
 
Principles of Administrative Justice  
 
Principles are the foundation of any system of justice. The work of various bodies reporting on 
devolving legislative powers to Wales, and on jurisdictional arrangements, has been 
underpinned by a principled approach to good administration.19 Emphasis has been placed on 
devolving competences for the benefit of public administration and social justice, not on the 
incremental increase in power for its own sake.  
 In 2007 Mark Drakeford (Wales’ First Minister since late 2018) proposed a Welsh 
commitment to social justice anchored in principles including the value of good governance, 
an ethic of participation, and improving equality of outcome.20 This connection to substantive 
equality has remained evident since former First Minister Rhodri Morgan’s 2002 ‘clear red 
water’ speech where he argued that Wales should take a different approach to the politics of 
Westminster, noting: “Our commitment to equality leads directly to a model of the relationship 
                                                          
17 Commission on Justice in Wales <https://gov.wales/commission-justice-wales/what-we-do>.  
18 Commission on Justice in Wales, Justice in Wales for the People of Wales (October 2019) (‘Thomas 
Commission’) 
19 The Richard Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales 
(2004). 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100404200945/http:/www.richardcommission.gov.uk/content/fin
alreport/report-e.pdf>; Silk Commission, n 7, Thomas Commission, n 18. 
20  Mark Drakeford, ‘Social Justice in a Devolved Wales’ (2007) 15(2) Journal of Public Finance and Public 
Choice 171. 
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between the government and the individual which regards the individual as a citizen rather than 
as a consumer”.21  The political majority in Wales continues to back state provision of public 
services and ‘progressive universalism’ supporting those most in need.22 In essence a Welsh 
approach to administrative justice is rooted in the view that good governance is “good for 
you”.23 
 However, that the concept of administrative justice is still a relatively unfamiliar one in 
Wales, and as one Assembly Member put it, “is not on the lips of my constituents”.24 So, whilst 
there is significant evidence from which to construct a principled Welsh approach, those 
responsible for the system may take more convincing that this is indeed their construct, and 
that it matters.  
The importance of underlying principles was recognised by the Committee for 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals in Wales (CAJTW), which considered one of its primary 
tasks to be creating a set of Administrative Justice Principles for Wales (the ‘Principles’). The 
Principles designate administrative justice as a fundamental right and a cornerstone to social 
justice.25 They cover decision-making, systems and procedures, and values and behaviours. 
They are outward looking, being based in part on a synthesis of developing European and 
global standards.  
When comparing the Welsh conception of administrative justice to a possible 
Australian account, a likely difference is that the Welsh approach is focused more on 
administrative justice as a collective social good, than as a means of providing individualised 
substantive justice. Matthew Groves has noted that during the 1999 Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law Annual Conference on the theme of administrative justice, no speaker 
offered a detailed or even working definition of the concept.26 The Australian Administrative 
Review Council (ARC), unlike the Welsh CAJTW, did not develop specific administrative 
                                                          
21 Rhodri Morgan, ‘Clear Red Water’ (speech to the National Centre for Public Policy, Swansea, December 2002) 
<https://www.sochealth.co.uk/the-socialist-health-association/sha-country-and-branch-organisation/sha-
wales/clear-red-water/>. 
22 Matthew Wall and Sophie Williams, ‘Seeking Evidence for a Welsh Progressive Consensus: Party Positioning 
in the 2016 National Assembly for Wales Election’ (2017) Parliamentary Affairs 1. 
23 Drakeford, n 20.  
24 Sir Adrian Webb, Ray Burningham and Sarah Nason, ‘Oral Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales’ 
(23 March 2019). 
25 Committee on Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales, Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone of Social 
Justice in Wales; Reform priorities for the Fifth Assembly (2016) 
<https://gov.wales/docs/cabinetstatements/2016/160729cornerstoneofsocialjustice.pdf>. 
26 Matthew Groves, ‘Administrative Justice in Australian Administrative Law’ (2011) 66 Australian Institute of 
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justice principles, but it has espoused a collection of public law values including fairness, 
lawfulness, rationality openness (or transparency) and efficiency.27  
 It is likely that the basis of administrative justice in Australia remains as expressed by 
the Kerr Committee; that Federal institutions at least are intended to reconcile the requirements 
of efficiency in administration, and justice to the citizen. Australian literature highlights the 
role of individuals, emphasising they are recipients of justice and therefore central to 
administrative justice.28  However, the individual’s interests should be balanced against the 
distributive justice focus of public administration. The Australian concept stresses that 
individuals who access the administrative justice system are looking for a particular substantive 
outcome.  
 The Welsh conception mirrors this commitment to individuals as rights bearers in the 
administrative justice system. However, a difference may be the Welsh focus on protecting 
individuals through engagement and involvement, giving them a voice or co-operative role in 
developing and delivering public services, but less emphasis on securing individual substantive 
rights through tribunal (and court) procedures and remedies. What we cannot be certain of is 
whether this ‘egalitarian’29 Welsh approach to administrative justice is the product of 
principled design, or the default implications of limited power and responsibility over the full 
purview of justice functions (courts, judges, legal aid, the legal profession and so on).  
Welsh Government’s response to the CAJTW Principles was relatively lukewarm, 
noting that “the proposed principles closely reflect existing values and legislative provisions 
that inform working practices. The CAJTW formulation will provide a helpful source of 
guidance for the Welsh Government”.30 It is difficult to determine how much the Principles 
have been used as there are few references to them in published documents, whereas there have 
been occasions where explicitly testing proposed statutory redress measures against the 
Principles could have avoided problems further down the line.  
Ongoing research has recommended that the President of Welsh Tribunals incorporates 
the Principles (or a suitably amended version of them) into the developing rules and procedures 
                                                          
27 Administrative Review Council, The Scope of Judicial Review (Report No 47, 2006) 30.  
28 Robin Creyke, ‘Administrative Justice in Australia’ in Michael Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in Context 
(Hart Publishing 2010). 
29 An egalitarian system purports to engage users as partners in the process of procuring and delivering public 
services, and in the processes of decision-making and dispute resolution. See Simon Halliday and Colin Scott, ‘A 
Cultural Analysis of Administrative Justice’ in Michael Alder (ed), Administrative Justice in Context (Hart 
Publishing 2009).  
30 Welsh Government Response to CAJTW (2016) 
<https://gov.wales/docs/cabinetstatements/2016/160729justicetribunalsreportresponseen.pdf>.  
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of Welsh Tribunals.31 The research also recommend that the Law Commission examines how 
best to incorporate the Principles into any proposed reforms to the Welsh Tribunals system as 
part of its forthcoming project. The background to this project is that whilst some of the gaps 
in Welsh Tribunal structural and procedural DNA have been filled by administrative 
arrangements and statutory reform, inconsistency and complexity remains in processes and 
legislative frameworks that developed prior to devolution, and which are now inconsistent with 
the Wales Act 2017. In this context, the Law Commission has a broad remit to consider the 
following: 
 
• the roles of the President of Welsh Tribunals and the Welsh Tribunals Unit 
• appointment and discipline of Tribunal judges and other members 
• appointment of Presidents/Deputies 
• power to make and standardise procedural rules 
• appeals processes 
• complaints process 
• protecting judicial independence32 
 
The project is anticipated to result in a draft Welsh Tribunals Bill designed to establish an 
appropriate degree of coherence and consistency in procedures.    
 
Structure and Administration  
 
Matters the Law Commission will have to grapple with include the strands of DNA concerning 
structure and administration. Unlike the reserved tribunals of England and Wales, and many 
Australian tribunals (at Commonwealth, and State and Territory level) the Welsh Tribunals 
have not been amalgamated into a single structure. In England and Wales reserved bodies, 
amalgamation has been through the creation of a single tribunal edifice incorporating a range 
of existing disparate bodies into a tier and chamber structure. These reforms were 
recommended by the 2001 Leggatt Report and enacted in the Tribunals Courts and 
Enforcement Act (TCEA) 2007.  
                                                          
31 Sarah Nason, Administrative Justice: Wales’ First Devolved Justice System: Evaluation and Recommendations 
(December 2018) <http://adminjustice.bangor.ac.uk/documents/AJWalesReportESRCDec18.pdf>. 
32 Law Commission, ‘New Welsh law reform project on tribunals announced’ (26 July 2018) 
<https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/new-welsh-law-reform-project-on-tribunals-announced/>. 
 9 
When Leggatt reported, powers over a range of tribunals had already been transferred 
to the Assembly. Although England and Wales (and UK) tribunals have been increasingly 
judicialised, at the time of devolution tribunal jurisdictions nevertheless attached to the 
administrative policy fields that transferred from the UK Government Wales Office to the 
Assembly (and subsequently to Welsh Government). 33 Despite Leggatt’s remit not extending 
directly to devolved tribunals, he highlighted the need for cross-border operation.34  
 
The process is complex because devolution has been achieved in different ways in each 
country as regards jurisdiction, powers, policy responsibilities, legislation and 
operational matters. There are tensions between general (devolved) administrative 
justice matters and the reservation of UK tribunals.35 
 
That devolved tribunals in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland remained outside the TCEA 
2007 structure has sometimes compounded the ad hoc development that Leggatt hoped to 
resolve.36 He proposed closer inter-governmental relations as a means to ensure that devolved 
issues were considered during tribunal reform.37 However, the UK’s inter-governmental 
mechanisms have come under consistent strain, and justice is no exception.38 
 An innovation of the TCEA 2007 was the introduction of a statutory definition of an 
administrative justice system. This would have been of limited value in itself, without the 
creation of an Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) to oversee that system. 
This included a Welsh Committee with a statutory duty to oversee administrative justice as it 
applies to Wales, extending to tribunals administered by the Welsh Government. This provided 
an opportunity to define devolved tribunals operating in Wales in a converging, but loose and 
non-comprehensive structure based on the statutory remit of the Welsh Committee.39 In 2010 
                                                          
33 HM Government, A Voice for Wales: A White Paper (Cm3718, July 1997); Roderick Evans J, ‘Devolution and 
the Administration of Justice’ (Lord Callaghan Memorial Lecture 2010, Swansea University, 19 February 2010). 
34 Sir Andrew Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (March 2001) [11.4]. 
35 Leggatt, n 34, [11.3]. 
36 Leggatt, n 34, [1.3]. 
37 Leggatt, n 34, [11.5]. 
38 Jagged Edge, n 16, 43; Nicola McEwen, Michael Kenny, Jack Sheldon and Coree Brown Swan, Reforming 
Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom (November 2018); Brian Thompson, ‘Opportunities and 
Constraints: Reflections on Reforming Administrative Jsutice Within and Across the United Kingdom’ in Sarah 
Nason (ed), Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives (UWP, 2017).  
39 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK) sch 7, pt 4, para 27 defined them as tribunals whose functions 
are only exercisable in Wales and where Welsh Ministers have powers to either appoint or make regulations; See 
also Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (Listed Tribunals) (Wales) Order 2007, SI 2007/2876 (W.250). 
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the Welsh Committee undertook a Review of Tribunals Operating in Wales,40 identifying 
relevant bodies, some administered by Welsh Government departments, others by local 
authorities, some long standing, others ad hoc. This Review highlighted matters to be rectified, 
including independence and impartiality, accessibility for users, efficiency and effectiveness, 
and coherence.41  
The Report emphasised contextual differences between England and Wales, and also 
between Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Differences relating to devolution settlements, 
the absence of a separate Welsh legal jurisdiction (Scotland and Northern Ireland both being 
separate from the England and Wales jurisdiction), and the comparative size and scale of 
tribunal decision-making.42  
 Welsh Government has subsequently followed an incremental approach, especially in 
relation to reforming tribunal administration, beginning with the establishment of an 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Unit (now known as the Welsh Tribunals Unit (WTU)). 
The WTU provides a unified management structure, and some independence from policy 
departments.43 This form of ‘shared services’ model also operates for some smaller federal 
tribunals in Canada44 and allows access to pooled resources, technology, and expertise, 
including linguistic expertise valuable for a bilingual system.45  
Amalgamation is not off the table and has been proposed for tribunals in the smaller 
jurisdiction of Northern Ireland (a population just over half that of Wales). However, this 
process has been paused due to the current suspension of devolution to Northern Ireland (at the 
time of writing). On the other hand, reform in Scotland is on-going with a six chamber First-
tier Tribunal and a single chamber Upper Tribunal having been established.46 Following the 
Scotland Act 2016, there are also further provisions to transfer responsibility for management 
and operation of some reserved tribunals to Scotland. The President of Scottish Tribunals has 
expressed frustration with the lack of development in transferring employment, tax and social 
security jurisdictions, whilst recognising that much of this delay is caused by inevitable 
                                                          
40 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council: Welsh Committee, Review of Tribunals Operating in Wales 
(2010) 
41 Tribunals Operating in Wales, n 40, 24-25. 
42 Tribunals Operating in Wales, n 40, [69]. 
43 Administrative Justice n 25, [25]. 
44 Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Act, SC 2014, c 20. 
45 Philip Bryden, ‘A Canadian Perspective on Tribunal Independence’ paper presented to a Council of Australasian 
Tribunals (COAT) seminar, Adelaide (16 April 2015) cited in Robin Creyke, ‘Amalgamation of Tribunals in 
Australia: Whether ‘tis Better ... ?’ in Sarah Nason (ed), Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative 
Perspectives (UWP 2017) 325. 
46 Judicial Office for Scotland, The Scottish Tribunals: Annual Report prepared by the President of the Scottish 
Tribunals, 1 December 2016 - 31 March 2018 (September 2018) Annex A. 
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financial constraints as well as ensuring that transferred judges retain the same terms and 
conditions of service, particularly as regards security of tenure.47 
Australian commentators note that tribunal reforms, and in particular the amalgamation 
of tribunals, have often been undertaken for political and pragmatic reasons, with little if any 
independent empirical evidence or inquiry to support them. Matthew Groves argues that whilst 
the AAT was originally set up as an interface between citizens and government as a means of 
increasing access to justice, this has been supplanted by aspirations of efficiency and 
informality directly linked to costs savings. Similar concerns have been expressed in the UK, 
perhaps less so in relation to the amalgamation of England and Wales and UK tribunals (though 
there has been no evidence-based review of the success of the Leggatt reforms), but 
increasingly in relation to the introduction of compulsory internal administrative review prior 
to a tribunal appeal, and the digitalisation programme.48  
Robin Creyke has proposed an approach to tribunal reforms, and particularly to tribunal 
amalgamation, that takes into account organizational theory.49 She argues that Wales should 
take a less hasty approach than has occurred in other jurisdictions and should consider four key 
factors; political commitment, organizational structure, process and procedure and 
organizational culture. Each of these factors requires discussion and some are equivalent to the 





An important aspect of organizational structure, and particular processes (especially those 
relating to tribunal judges) is independence. In the Welsh structure, WTU staff are Welsh 
Government employees.50 Though not providing complete independence, this is consistent 
with AJTC Welsh Committee recommendations about a suitable structure for Wales for the 
time being.51 This structure is also, to some degree, consistent with developments in other parts 
of the UK and the common law world. For example, Scottish devolved tribunals were initially 
administered by an executive unit of the Scottish Government before being incorporated into 
                                                          
47 The Scottish Tribunals Annual Report, n 46, 19. 
48 Robert Thomas, ‘Current Developments in UK Tribunals: Challenges for Administrative Justice’ in Sarah 
Nason (ed), Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives (UWP 2017).  
49 Robin Creyke, n 35. 
50 Research Interview with Head of WTU (June 2019). 
51 Tribunals Operating in Wales, n 40, [68], [70]. 
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the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service.52 This approach provides what Sossin has referred 
to as ‘quasi-independence’; such quasi-independent bodies are often tied to legislation 
designed to meet quite specific policy objectives, and they have limited control over their 
budgets and staff appointments.53 Sossin suggests that with strong political leadership it is 
possible to uphold this quasi-independent structure.54  
At least some Welsh Tribunal leaders are satisfied with the current ‘quasi-independent’ 
administrative arrangements. The Chairperson of the Agricultural Land Tribunal for Wales has 
noted that it ‘is already a well-understood separation of roles, reflecting the separation of 
powers between the judiciary and the executive’.55 A research interviewee from the WTU 
explained that the WTU is perceived differently to other Welsh Government departments and 
workstreams, and that there is growing element of respect and understanding particularly for 
judicial independence and expertise, though this has taken some time to establish. It was also 
suggested that having a judicial lead (the President of Welsh Tribunals) creates space between 
the individual tribunal presidents and Ministers.56 Nevertheless, outward perceptions of the 
relationship between WTU and Welsh Government are also important.  
The President of Welsh Tribunals has proposed that the WTU structure should be 
reformed as an executive agency.57 One reason for this is the importance of ensuring not only 
that judicial independence is maintained, but that it is “seen to be maintained” as “the 
cornerstone of the democratic system”.58 There is still some room for flexibility in the precise 
model that would enhance independence and clarify the relationship between Welsh 
Government and the WTU. For example, the Welsh Revenue Authority, the first non-
ministerial government department established by the Welsh Government, could provide a 
template for developing the WTU.59 The Commission on Justice in Wales has now 
recommended that: “The Welsh Tribunals Unit should have structural independence”.60 If the 
                                                          
52 Scottish Government, Consultation on the Scottish Government’s Proposals for a New Tribunal System for 
Scotland (2012) [3.21]-[3.28]; Administrative Justice and Tribunal Council: Scottish Committee, Tribunal Reform 
in Scotland: A Vision for the Future (2010) [4.35]. 
53 Lorne Sossin, ‘The puzzle of administrative independence and parliamentary democracy in the common law 
world: A Canadian perspective’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth (eds) Comparative Administrative 
Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 212. 
54 Lorne Sossin, n 53, 220-221. 
55 Commission on Justice in Wales, Oral Evidence Session (22 March 2019) 
<https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-
05/Oral%20evidence%20to%20the%20Justice%20Commission%20on%20Tribunals%20in%20Wales_0.pdf>. 
56 Research Interview with Head of WTU (June 2019). 
57 President of Welsh Tribunals, First Annual Report (31 March 2019) 9-10. 
58 President of Welsh Tribunals, n 57, 10. 
59 Welsh Revenue Authority, Annual Report and Accounts 2017-19 (WG38294, 2019).  
60 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 27. 
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WTU is reformed as an executive agency this may well then be short-lived, with the Justice 
Commission (and the President of Welsh Tribunals who was also a Commissioner) now openly 
favouring an independent tribunals service chaired by the President (based on the Scottish 
model). This would be desirable not only for the immediate benefits, but also in anticipation 
of a longer-term transfer of additional justice functions to Wales.  
The current Welsh ‘quasi-independence’ model is quite different to the constitutional 
position of many Australian tribunals, which are, in effect, part of the executive branch and 
defined specifically as ‘not courts’. When considering the case for England and Wales, and 
UK-wide reforms the Leggatt Committee recognised tribunals as judicial bodies, (and superior 
courts of record in the case of the Upper Tribunal), insisting that they should have the same 
independent status as courts.61 Although Leggatt welcomed some comparisons with Australian 
tribunals as having an “admirable and distinctive role” within the executive branch, he 
concluded that the 1957 Franks Committee had set UK tribunals on a judicial path.62 The more 
recent Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 follows this judicial trajectory. Nevertheless, there has 
been discussion of the potential value of a ‘merits review’ approach particularly in high-volume 
UK tribunal jurisdictions (especially immigration and social security);63 the case for UK 
tribunals considering cases on their substantive merits is not entirely closed.  
 
Procedure and Practice 
 
Leggatt’s equation of courts and tribunals is said to have led to the ‘judicialisation’ of tribunals; 
increased formalism in rules, practices and procedures, and an increase in adversarialism in at 
least some jurisdictions. This form of judicialisation or juridification is not so evident in the 
Welsh Tribunals. Their flexibility and adaptability has been recognised, including where lack 
of amalgamation within a courts and tribunals structure has led to making better use of less 
formal venues more sensitive to user perspectives. Cuts to the HMCTS England and Wales 
estate will have less impact on Welsh Tribunals which have only made limited use of court 
buildings. It is fair to say that the Welsh Tribunals have to an extent developed ad hoc practices 
suited to the needs of particular jurisdictions, however this adaptability does not entirely 
ameliorate concerns caused by inconsistencies across rule and regulation making processes. 
                                                          
61 Leggatt, n 34, [2.5]; Lorne Sossin, n 53, 218. 
62 Leggatt, n 34, [2.5]. 
63 Robert Thomas and Joe Tomlinson, ‘A Design Problem for Judicial Review: What We Know and What We 
Need to Know about Immigration Judicial Reviews’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (16th Mar 2017) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/>. 
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Despite Welsh Government having most administrative responsibility for Welsh 
Tribunals, procedural rules stem from a range of legal sources. For example, rules and 
regulations of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal for Wales are formally laid down by the Lord 
Chancellor, despite funding and administration of the tribunal being the responsibility of the 
WTU. There are also legacy issues, where certain English subject-matter jurisdictions (for 
example Residential Property Tribunals) have been transferred to the First-tier Tribunal under 
the TCEA 2007, whereas the sister Welsh jurisdiction (the Residential Property Tribunal for 
Wales) remains governed largely by sections of England and Wales legislation (the Housing 
Act 2004) that no longer apply to England.64 This leaves old rules and regulations designed for 
England and Wales tribunals operating in a different, Wales only, constitutional and public 
administration context. 
Wales’ first attempt at devising a wholly devolved administrative justice regime was 
the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011, creating a system of Welsh Language Standards, 
a Welsh Language Commissioner and a Welsh Language Tribunal.65 Although this is the 
primary means for protecting a national language, the main emphasis of the legislation is on 
administrative procedures, detailing the role and functions of the language regulator (the 
Commissioner) and the regulator’s regulator (the Welsh Language Tribunal (WLT)). Some 
argue that this has come at the expense of outlining the content of legally enforceable 
substantive language rights.66 Individuals cannot directly challenge the content of Welsh 
Language Standards developed by the Welsh Language Commissioner. If a complainant 
considers there has been a flaw in the Commissioner’s investigation into compliance with its 
own Standards, they can appeal to the WLT. 
The WLT is a unique case study as it was the Welsh Government and Assembly’s first 
attempt at establishing a body with judicial functions. The WLT appointment regulations 
require Welsh Ministers to ‘have regard’ to upholding the principles of rule of law and 
independence of the Tribunal.67 Arrangements were also made for a member of the Law 
Commission to sit on the panel appointing the tribunal President and members.68 The 2011 
Measure copies Part 2 of TCEA 2007 in determining whether a person satisfies judicial-
appointments eligibility conditions. In terms of drawing up the tribunal regulations themselves, 
                                                          
64 Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2013, SI 2013/1036, sch 2, pt 1 para 1. 
65 Catrin F Huws, ‘Administrative Justice and the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011’ in Sarah Nason (ed), 
Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives (Cardiff, UWP, 2017). 
66 Huws, n 65. 
67 Welsh Language Tribunal (Appointment) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3139.  
68 Welsh Government, Appointment of the President and other members of the Welsh Language Tribunal: 
Statement of Appointment Policy and Procedure (Version 1(10.12.13)) [4.3.1]. 
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the WLT President was primarily responsible for the process with support from CAJTW, thus 
ensuring expertise and impartiality from government.  
In relation to procedures and practices, the President of Welsh Tribunals is also required 
to have regard to innovative methods of dispute resolution. Such methods are anticipated to 
include mediation processes and other ADR techniques, inquisitorial methods, and 
digitalisation. A previous Report of the Justice in Wales Stakeholder Group, recommended that 
Welsh Government should consider the benefits of adopting inquisitorial approaches in any of 
the devolved tribunals it administers.69 However, the Report did not examine any research and 
commentary around different types of approaches, and that adversarial/inquisitorial and 
active/passive methods are a continuum of different styles rather than absolutes. It did however 
note that changing judicial and administrative styles could involve costs and new training 
requirements and should only be adopted in order to improve outcomes for individuals.  
In the context of any move to systematise or rationalise Welsh Tribunal procedures and 
processes, whether combined with amalgamation of jurisdictions or not, there must be an 
appropriate degree of balancing specialisation and generalisation within tribunal rules and 
balancing the interests of a range of stakeholders. There is a particular concern to ensure that 
the needs of smaller jurisdictions are not swamped by those with larger caseloads, for example 
the caseload of the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales is over 2,000 per-annum whereas 
that of the WLT is circa five to ten per-annum.   
Another matter for clarification and reform will be the disjointed appeal routes from 
Welsh Tribunals.70 For example, some appeals go to the Administrative Court and others to 
various Chambers of the England and Wales Upper Tribunal. The only real consistency is that 
there are no devolved judicial bodies in Wales with the authority to set binding legal 
precedents.  
Another issue of procedure is the extent to which Welsh Tribunals should be digitalised. 
Electronic working is already evident within Welsh Tribunals, and it is notably easier for some 
tribunals to adapt their processes quickly depending on the nature of their caseloads. Reforms 
at England and Wales, and UK levels are progressing rapidly under the HMCTS digitalisation 
project.71 Through the Tribunals Judicial Ways of Working programme, tribunals will see 
                                                          
69 Justice Stakeholder Group, Law and Justice in Wales: Some Issues for the Next Assembly (March 2016) 
<https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/inline-documents/2018-11/written-statement-justice-stakeholder-groups-
report-law-and-justice-in-wales.pdf>.  
70 Research Interview President of Welsh Tribunals.  
71 Senior President of Tribunals, Tribunals Judicial Ways of Working (2019) <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/tribunals-jwow-response-1.pdf>; Joe Tomlinson, Justice in the Digital State: Assessing 
the next revolution in administrative justice (2019). 
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radical changes to how they operate,72 including for example, full video hearings and 
continuous online resolution.  
 
Digitalisation could have particular benefits for Wales, which has significant rural 
populations. However, advantages in terms of geography will need to be balanced against 
challenges of demography, digital exclusion and broadband access.73 Digitalisation reforms are 
on-going for a substantial number of cases from Wales that are determined in reserved tribunals 
(the biggest by far being the Social Security and Child Support Chamber of the First-tier 
Tribunal) and for appeals from Welsh Tribunals to the England and Wales Upper Tribunal. 
There are concerns around two-speed or multiple-speed processes diverging between England 
and Wales, where Welsh tribunals risk being left behind in part due to not being able to take 
advantage of economies of scale in technological developments. The WTU is likely to bide its 
time until sufficient information is available to evaluate the success of the HMCTS 
digitalisation programme with respect to jurisdictions where Wales has comparable devolved 
competence, such as in mental health and special educational needs. This is a wise move as the 
speed of the reforms and limited opportunities for independent research evaluation have 
alarmed commentators.74 That the reforms are taking place during a time of austerity cannot 
be ignored; if a particular degree of digitalisation prioritises efficiency over fairness and equal 
access to justice, this would not fit with the Welsh political approach to good administration.  
The Commission on Justice in Wales has now recommended that a strategy should be 
drawn up to ensure proper access to justice based on the needs of people of Wales. This should 
include a “workable court IT network” with video and digital facilities, assistance for users, 
improved information on accessing dispute resolution remotely, a “digital network” and a court 
centre in Cardiff “fit for a capital city”. 75 
 
Confidence and Standards  
 
The perceived fairness of tribunal procedures and practices is a factor going to public 
confidence, with 2015 research highlighting a lack of confidence in the capacity of the justice 
                                                          
72 Tribunals Judicial Ways of Working, n 71. 
73 Wales’ First Devolved Justice System, n 31, [103]-[105]. 
74 Public Law Project, The Digitalisation of Tribunals: What we know and what we need to know (PLP 2018) 
<https://publiclawproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The-Digitalisation-of-Tribunals-for-website.pdf>. 
75 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 39. 
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system as devolved to Wales to deliver quality outcomes and experiences comparable to 
combined England and Wales institutions.76  
CAJTW has stressed that individual users and legal professionals must be able to have 
confidence in the system and that it should deliver “at least as good a quality of justice as in 
England”. One way of achieving this is through ensuring quality within the judicial branch, 
with consistent judicial appraisal and discipline across the Welsh Tribunals, capable of passing 
‘parity test’ with England.77 Efforts to achieve this have highlighted the ‘jagged edges’ of 
devolution, especially regarding parity of judicial conditions, and parity of judicial opportunity. 
The judicial appointments process remains inconsistent across the Welsh Tribunals. For 
example, the Lord Chancellor appoints the president and legal chairs of the Special Educational 
Needs Tribunal for Wales (SENTW), whereas the appointment of lay members has been 
transferred to the Welsh Government (though Secretary of State consent is required).78  
The Welsh Government has adopted several administrative measures aimed to “achieve 
standards that are comparable with non-devolved tribunals”.79 There is a Framework 
Agreement between the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) and Welsh Government for 
recruitment and appointment processes. In practice the process for appointing tribunal judges 
is the same regardless of whether the Lord Chancellor or Welsh Ministers are the appointing 
body, however this is not reflected in statutory frameworks which are still disjointed.80  
In addition to the JAC, the Judicial Office has also provided support including 
providing access to judicial office guidance and training materials. The Welsh tribunal 
judiciary use the same ejudiciary communication network as England and Wales judges. This 
shows that WTU can ‘tap into’ non-devolved arrangements in order to provide a consistent 
level of service to the judiciary. Similar arrangements have previously been in place with the 
Judicial College (in respect of training) and the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) 
regarding complaints.  
CAJTW noted in 2016 that “although [the] Welsh judiciary [were] in effect ‘tied in’ to 
England and Wales institutions (the Judicial Office, Judicial Appointments Commission, 
Judicial College and Judicial Conduct Investigations Office)” the relationship between them 
                                                          
76 Sarah Nason, Understanding Administrative Justice in Wales (November 2015) 17 
<http://adminjustice.bangor.ac.uk/documents/full-report.pdf>.  
77 Administrative Justice, n 25, [25], recommendation 11. 
78 This will remain the case when the provisions for the Education Tribunal for Wales come into force under the 
Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunals for Wales (Wales) Act 2018 (Wales), s 91. 
79 Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW, n 30. 
80 Welsh Government Response to the CAJTW, n 30. 
 18 
has not been clear.81 In particular, the small size of Welsh Tribunals and complexity of their 
constitutional position hampered progression of more formal arrangements.82 There were also 
notable gaps. For example, JCIO do not extend over all devolved tribunals and the Wales 
Training Committee of the Judicial College has no responsibility for devolved Welsh Tribunals 
(only Welsh interests in the TCEA 2007 edifice).83 
CAJTW recommended a comprehensive set of formal agreements with judicial offices 
like JAC, Judicial College, and JCIO, 84 but it also emphasised that Welsh training should not 
be solely delivered by England and Wales bodies. Currently, training is arranged by the 
individual Welsh Tribunal presidents, with oversight from the President of Welsh Tribunals, 
and can be adapted to deal with emerging legislation. Joint ‘judge craft’ training days have also 
been discussed across the Welsh Tribunals. It has been suggested that the minimum amount of 
training is being met by these arrangements.85   
The WTU, in conjunction with the President of Welsh Tribunals and tribunal leads, is 
beginning to develop internal expertise and establishing equivalent roles to those within 
HMCTS, the JCIO and Judicial Office. A natural consequence of administering tribunals is the 
need to increase expertise in areas not previously the concern of Welsh Government such as 
judicial salaries, pensions, and complaints.86 This provides some insights into what will 
eventually be required to administer a potentially much larger set of judicial bodies in the case 
of further devolution.  
The Welsh Tribunal judiciary have in the past been concerned about parity of 
opportunity with the ‘English’ judiciary. Research in 2015 noted that there was little incentive 
for junior practitioners to undertake a judicial career in Wales due to lack of opportunities to 
sit. It was suggested that good candidates were being lost to England where there were more 
opportunities to gain experience. Participants worried about the risk of a ‘second-rate’ judiciary 
in Wales and ‘cross-ticketing’ of judges was identified as a way to tackle some concerns.87 The 
Wales Act 2017 now provides for Welsh Tribunal judges to be cross-deployed across the Welsh 
Tribunals, or to the First-tier Tribunal. Early indications are that this has been successful in 
terms of level of judicial interest and quality of candidates, it can also reduce recruitment 
                                                          
81 Administrative Justice, n 25, [26]. 
82 Administrative Justice, n 25, [26]. 
83 Administrative Justice, n 25, [28]; Commission on Justice in Wales, Oral Evidence Session (22 March 2019) 
<https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2019-
05/Oral%20evidence%20to%20the%20Justice%20Commission%20on%20Tribunals%20in%20Wales_0.pdf>.  
84 Administrative Justice, n 25, Recommendation 10. 
85 Research Interview with Head of WTU (June 2019).  
86 Research Interview with Head of WTU (June 2019). 
87 Understanding Administrative Justice, n 76, [7.6]-[7.9]. 
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costs.88 Cross-deployment into the First-tier Tribunal has also occurred in the case of the 
Property Chamber. A member of the tribunal judiciary in Wales has recently been appointed 
as a circuit judge; and there is a perceived sense of greater opportunities for career progression 
than back in 2015.  
 
Political Will and Jagged Edges  
 
Although the Welsh Government has made little ostensible use of the Administrative Justice 
Principles for Wales developed by CAJTW, the Counsel General has reinforced the importance 
of principle-based administrative decision-making in the context of modern devolved 
government. Such proposed principles were said to include; honesty, fairness, candidness, 
legality, rationality, proportionality and sustainability. With decisions subject to testing by 
review processes that are objectively fair and proportionate. Following up this account in an 
Assembly Plenary discussion he proposed that: 
 
we can expect that administrative decisions lead us to a more equal Wales...so that 
decisions taken by tribunals and by commissioners and by ombudsmen within the 
administrative justice system lead us to that outcome…89 
 
The current Welsh Government’s commitment to further devolution of responsibility for the 
administration of justice is encapsulated, again in the words of the Counsel General, that 
devolution of justice and the creation of a Welsh legal jurisdiction is inevitable.  
Welsh Government commitment to improving judicial independence through 
administrative and governance arrangements has more recently been matched by public 
statements. Such as the Counsel General’s Cabinet Statement on the Welsh Tribunal judiciary’s 
independence, coinciding with pressure on the UK Lord Chancellor for not defending the 
judiciary following press criticism of the main ‘Brexit’ judicial review case.90  
 However, when it comes to specific reforms that could increase the workload of Welsh 
Tribunals, political attitudes appear more reticent. We give three specific examples here, also 
highlighting other strands of DNA in tribunal development (such as appropriate procedures 
                                                          
88 President of Welsh Tribunals, n 57, 7; Research Interviews with Head of WTU (June 2019).  
89 Counsel General Questions (National Assembly for Wales, Plenary, 26 September 2018) 
<http://record.assembly.wales/Plenary/5352#A45564>. 
90 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2017] UKSC 5 and Counsel General, ‘Written Statement: 
independence of the Welsh tribunals’ (March 2017). 
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and coherent structures). These examples are education, residential property and returning 
again to the Welsh language. The first two examples also highlight the ‘jagged edges’ of 
devolution where policy responsibility and tribunal administration is devolved, whilst 




The Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunal (Wales) Act 2018 creates a new 
framework for supporting children of compulsory school age (or below) and young people in 
school or further education with Additional Learning Needs (ALN). It introduces a single 
statutory Individual Development Plan (IDP) that applies to all learners up to age 25, aimed at 
ensuring equity in terms of support and rights for those in post-16 education. Further core aims 
of the Act are more participation and collaboration in the development and implementation of 
IDPs; avoiding disagreements and early dispute resolution; and providing clear and consistent 
rights of appeal.  
The Act renames SENTW as the Education Tribunal. It is predicted to lead to an 
increase in Education Tribunal claims, as the right to appeal is extended from under 16s 
(through their parents/carers or in their own right where relevant) to young people up to the 
age of 25 pursuing further education. Other changes in the legislation will have a consequent 
impact on the types of cases issued and determined in the Education Tribunal, but not 
necessarily their frequency.  
Whilst some increase in caseload is accepted in consequence of substantive Welsh law 
reforms, there are also matters currently determined in non-devolved courts that could feasibly 
have been transferred to the Education Tribunal, but which will not be. These are disability 
discrimination cases under the UK Equality Act 2010 currently within the jurisdiction of the 
county courts. These cases are within the specialist expertise of Education Tribunal members 
and transferring them to the Tribunal could lead to a more integrated and less confusing system 
for users. It may be that the reason for not transferring this class of cases to the tribunal is more 
to do with concerns about Wales taking a different approach to England (where such cases are 
determined in county courts) than it is to do with further increases in the Welsh Tribunal 
caseload. 
In the education context the AJTC Welsh Committee, and later CAJTW, recommended 
that thought be given to transferring school admissions and school exclusions appeals into an 
Education Tribunal for Wales. These appeals are currently determined by panels convened by 
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Local Authorities (of which there are 22, potentially resulting in 22 different processes with 
concerns over consistency, fairness and transparency).91 However, following feasibility 
studies, the Welsh Government current view is that the Education Tribunal is not an 
‘appropriate vehicle’ for these types of appeals.92 The Commission on Justice in Wales has, 
however, stated: 
 
We are concerned that school admissions and exclusions appeals panels operate without 
any kind of judicial scrutiny save in those very rare cases in which an exclusion leads 
to an application for judicial review. The role of judges in determining disputes relating 
to the education of pupils has steadily increased over time as functions of public bodies 
have increased. We consider that a thorough appraisal of the operation of local authority 
appeal panels and oversight by the President of Welsh Tribunals of their decision 
making processes is required.93 
 
It is ultimately hard to escape the conclusion that rebranding SENTW as the Education Tribunal 
for Wales has been done in anticipation of longer-term expansion in the Tribunal’s subject-
matter jurisdiction.  
 
Residential Property  
 
The Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 will replace existing leases and licences in Wales with 
two types of ‘occupation contract’,94 designed to make renting a home simpler and easier. At 
present the majority of housing disputes are determined in the non-devolved county courts, 
with a smaller number of matters handled by the Residential Property Tribunal for Wales 
(RPTW). The legislative process provided an opportunity to reform how the majority of 
housing disputes are determined in Wales. In evidence during the Bill’s passage respondents 
expressed enthusiasm for increased use of ADR processes (especially mediation) and greater 
use of the RPTW to resolve housing disputes. In the view of specialist NGO Shelter Cymru: 
 
                                                          
91 Review of Tribunals Operating in Wales, n 40, [76]; Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone of Social Justice in 
Wales, n 26, [53]. 
92 Welsh Government Response to CAJTW, n 29, 4. 
93 Thomas Commission, n 18, para [6.47]. 
94 A secure contract modelled on the current secure tenancy used by local authorities, and a standard contract 
modelled on current assured shorthold tenancies used by the private sector. 
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The county court is not always the most effective route for resolving disputes. As well 
as the escalating court costs themselves, we also find that a lack of expertise in housing 
law among District Judges can sometimes result in delays and poor decision-making 
that ultimately prejudice both parties. Many other countries have specialist housing 
tribunals…We suggest that the most cost-effective solution for Wales may be to expand 
the role of the Residential Property Tribunal, which is currently quite under-used. 
Creating a specialist tribunal for Wales would considerably increase landlords’ and 
tenants’ confidence that they can resolve disputes quickly and fairly when they need 
to…95 
 
However, in response to further information requested by the Assembly Equality, Communities 
and Local Government Committee, the Residential Landlords Association (RLA) argued that 
the majority of cases should remain in the county courts as HMCTS already has “the necessary 
infrastructure” in place. The RLA proposed that as the RPTW is not assimilated into a courts 
and tribunals service it lacks sufficient resources (e.g., designated hearing venues). It also noted 
that RPTW members are fee paid part-time judges, not permanent salaried appointees and that 
“with the current climate affecting public expenditure, it is unrealistic to think that this 
[expanding the jurisdiction of the RPTW to include possession claims] is a priority to which 
resources could be devoted”.96 Expanding the jurisdiction of the RPTW to include possession 
claims would, for example, increase its caseload from approx. 150 per-annum to over 4,000 
cases per-annum.  
 Other issues raised included the processes and procedures of each institution. Some 
respondents suggested that their experience of county court claims had been of highly 
adversarial procedures (especially in anti-social behaviour cases) and they were concerned 
about whether a tribunal is the appropriate venue for more ‘heated’ disputes.97  
The crux is that possession and anti-social behaviour claims are said to be more 
adversarial than say rent assessment or disrepair cases, as such it is argued they should take 
place in a court and the parties should be legally represented. Such claims should not be 
determined in tribunals where more inquisitorial procedures are used, where parties ‘need’ not 
                                                          
95 Shelter Cymru, Response to the Communities, Local Government and Equality Committee inquiry into the 
general principles of the Renting Homes Bill (2015) <https://sheltercymru.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Renting-Homes-general-principles-evidence-web.pdf>. 
96 Residential Landlord Association, Letter to Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee (27 May 
2015) <http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s40793/RH%2029b%20-
%20Residential%20Landlords%20Association.pdf>. 
97 Chair of Housing Law Committee, Law Society, Oral evidence, 30 April [174].  
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be legally represented, and specifically where legal aid funding for representation is not 
available. A representative from HLPA put this starkly: “The downside of the residential 
property tribunal is, one, there will never be legal aid for it. Just conceptually, there isn’t legal 
aid for tribunals. It’s just the divide that we strike as a matter of legal policy in this country”. 
Presumably he was referring here to ‘England and Wales’ as Wales has not yet had any 
opportunity to develop a legal aid policy, this being a reserved matter. The Commission on 
Justice in Wales has now recommended that: 
 
The funding for legal aid and for the third sector providing advice and assistance 
should be brought together in Wales to form a single fund under the strategic 
direction of an independent body.98 
 
England and Wales wide reforms have greatly reduced the availability of legal aid funding for 
representation in housing claims in the county courts; in practice many types of claim, e.g., 
social housing possession cases, are rarely at the extreme end of an adversarial-inquisitorial 
continuum (cf mortgage company possession claims); and more often than not defendants in 
tribunal proceedings will be legally represented whereas claimants will not be.99 Arguments 
about adversarial and inquisitorial procedures, and represented and unrepresented parties, may 
no longer stack up. These are just some reasons why the UK Government is currently 
considering the case for a specialist housing court combing the housing dispute resolution 
jurisdictions of the county courts (in England and Wales) and the First-tier Tribunal Property 
Chamber (in England), but not (it would appear) the jurisdiction of the RPTW. Devolution of 
responsibility for the administration of particular tribunals is not necessarily permanent, though 
politically very hard to reverse. It would not be impossible for the RPTW to be absorbed into 
an England and Wales housing court, and such ‘reverse devolution’ was actually proposed by 
the Law Commission in a 2007 consultation on proportionate dispute resolution in housing.100 
It is extremely unlikely this would take place now given the political context and increasing 
divergence between English and Welsh housing law.  
Institutional hierarchies are just part of the ‘jagged edge’ that will continue to cause 
issues for Wales, as many appeals on a point of law from Welsh Tribunals are to England and 
                                                          
98 Thomas Commission, n 18, Recommendation 1. 
99 Housing Law Practitioners Association (HLPA), Oral evidence, 20 May [136].  
100Law Commission, Housing: Proportionate Dispute Resolution – The Role of Tribunals (Consultation Paper 
180, 2007). 
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Wales Upper Tribunal Chambers or to the non-devolved Administrative Court. As it stands 
appeals from the RPTW go to the England and Wales Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), which 
already has a back-log of cases and would struggle to deal with additional appeals from Wales 
should the RPTW jurisdiction be expanded. Further to this, decisions made by the Upper 
Tribunal are not binding on the county court as there is no legal hierarchy between them, so in 
cases where there is significant inter-play between aspects of county court jurisdiction and 
aspects of actual (or proposed future) jurisdiction of the RPTW, any appeal decisions taken by 
the Upper Tribunal would not be binding on the county courts causing what HLPA describes 
as ‘legal chaos’.101 
The Law Society for England and Wales has been particularly critical of proposals to 
establish a single housing court, noting that central issues delaying resolution of disputes are 
insufficient resourcing of the county courts, and the (necessary) procedural requirements that 
must be complied with before a person can be evicted from their home.102 The establishment 
of a more specialist court will invite further reductions in the availability of legal aid funding 
for advice and representation, leading to even higher numbers of unrepresented litigants.  
In relation to unrepresented claimants, the RPTW President has stressed that tribunal 
members have considerable experience and “are very good at teasing out what the issues 
are…making sure that both sides of the argument are heard and the issues are aired”. Despite 
criticism from the Upper Tribunal about tribunals taking issues that parties have not raised, he 
felt that “it is our obligation as an expert tribunal to get to the crux of the matter”.103 This 
reflection may disclose future concerns. The President of Welsh Tribunals is required to have 
regard to innovative methods of dispute resolution, but exercising this function may cause some 
‘jagged edge’ tension if it involves developing active inquisitorial methods in Welsh Tribunals 
with appeal routes to the England and Wales Upper Tribunal, especially if the latter is sceptical 
about these approaches.  
Ultimately with respect to Renting Homes, the Assembly Committee recommended a 
modest transfer of some existing types of county court claims to the RPTW, and that some new 
claims (arising specifically in the context of renting Homes (Wales) obligations) also be 
determined by the tribunal. These included; disputes in relation to rent increases, fitness for 
human habitation issues, succession rights, and failure to supply a contract. The President of 
                                                          
101 HLPA n 100, [137]-[138].  
102 Law Society, Considering the case for a Housing Court - Law Society response (January 2019): 
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the RPTW indicated that the tribunal would be an appropriately specialised forum to determine 
these cases, but that it would require additional resources.104 However, the Welsh Minister 
responded to the Committee stating: “Whilst such an amendment may initially have some 
attraction, the Residential Property Tribunal for Wales does not have the necessary capacity to 
deal with such disputes. Building in such capacity would be costly and would need to be fully 
considered and consulted upon”.105 
 Overall when enacting new legislation imposing duties on public bodies in Wales, the 
Assembly has generally tended not to interfere with administrative justice redress processes, 
deciding instead to roll over existing mechanisms from England and Wales legislation. 
Sometimes this is done without any real consideration of why these redress processes were 
initially chosen and whether such original justifications remain, there has also tended to be 
little consideration of data showing how many people are actually using these processes and 
their outcomes. For example, although the Housing (Wales) Act 2014 makes some additional 
use of the RPTW, the overwhelming majority of claims under the Act adopt the internal review 
followed by county court appeal route followed in previous England and Wales legislation. 
Shelter Cymru has expressed concerns about the lack of county court appeals under the Act 
(approximately 2-4 per-annum) and the subsequently limited independent judicial 
interpretation of new substantive Welsh law. It is an open question whether a tribunal appeal 
route might have proven more accessible.106 The Commission on Justice in Wales has argued: 
 
In relation to housing disputes, for example, a single court or tribunal is needed to more 
efficiently deal with such matters. Even though the UK Government has not yet reached 
a decision on a single housing court, the reasons for providing all decisions to be made 
by a single judicial body are compelling. A single judicial body would be able to 
develop expertise and an overview of all the different issues that will arise on housing. 
The creation of the single court would also facilitate access to justice to those with 
housing disputes. Our analysis is that the current structure for resolving disputes 
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demonstrates that there is a need to unify courts and tribunals, both for civil justice and 
administrative justice.107 
 
The Commission has therefore recommended that: ‘Courts and tribunals which determine 
disputes in both civil and administrative law should be under one unified system in Wales’.108 
This could ultimately lead to Wales developing its own version of Civil and Administrative 
Tribunals (CATs) common in Australia.  
 
Welsh Language  
 
Returning to the Welsh Language Tribunal, the context is quite different. The Welsh language 
protection regime was the Welsh Government and Assembly’s first attempt at establishing a 
full administrative justice process including an appellate tribunal. However, this only lasted six 
years before a 2017 White Paper proposed further reforms suggesting that; the existing regime 
is too bureaucratic, does not ensure value for money, and does not strike a proportionate 
balance between promoting the Welsh language and regulating compliance with Welsh 
Language Standards.109 New proposals emphasised internal processes, with individuals being 
required to complain first to the public body before taking their complaint to a new Welsh 
Language Commission (to replace the existing Commissioner). However, as a package the 
reforms were described as regressive by language campaigners and Plaid Cymru.110 They had 
the potential to diminish individual rights to use Welsh; first, by the provision that the Welsh 
Language Commission should only investigate complaints in ‘serious’ cases and second by 
watering down the content of the Standards. A third issue was the proposal to introduce a 
permission requirement into some appeals to the WLT.  
The proposals had a policy objective of avoiding disputes and resolving issues as early 
and informally as possible but appeared to gloss over some more specifically legal 
technicalities. In particular, the nuances involved in determining what might be a ‘serious 
breach’ of Standards before the Commission. Another nuance is the distinction between 
appeals and reviews in the WLT, as this impacts on whether introducing a permission 
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requirement would be principled and consistent. There was also no evidence that the WLT was 
inundated by an unmanageable caseload at the time, however in response to consultation the 
WLT President agreed that a permission filter could be imposed on some types of case (akin 
to judicial review) given an anticipated rise in the tribunals caseload and the impact that this 
would also have on the Commissioner.111 However, he further concluded that there is no 
evidence of the need to add a permission filter into cases where an individual complainant has 
a right to appeal to the WLT, as this could give rise to “unintended and unexpected 
complications”. 
The proposals are not in fact being taken forward, with the Minister for International 
Relations and the Welsh Language instead looking to reconsider the balance between the 
Welsh Language Commissioner’s language promotion and regulation functions. Within this 
broader picture the role of the WLT is quite limited, and Welsh Government has specifically 
rejected a proposal for enacting a right to use Welsh in primary legislation, to be enforced by 
a direct appeal route to the WLT.112  
 
A Welsh Model of Administrative Justice: Implications for Tribunal Reform? 
 
In comparing different nations’ approaches to administrative justice, Michael Asimow has 
proposed ‘models of administrative adjudication’. He argues that there are three phases to 
administrative justice; the initial decision, administrative reconsideration and judicial review 
(in effect any reviews or appeals on a point of law). For Asimow, the initial decision does not 
actually refer to the front-line decision, it refers to the first opportunity a person has to query 
that decision. A key relevant insight is that: 
 
Each country tends to rely primarily on one of the three phases (that is, initial decision, 
reconsideration, or judicial review) to achieve a fair and accurate result. Efficiency 
concerns require countries to make this choice. Countries cannot afford to invest 
resources equally in two, much less all three, of the phases. The phase that each country 
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chooses as the recipient of most resources is likely to be the phase that private parties 
regard as providing their best chance to win the case.113 
 
Asimow concludes that the UK and Australia follow the same model of administrative 
adjudication because the phase of adjudication receiving the largest state resource is tribunal 
reconsideration. Asimow’s models are admittedly over-simplifications, as growing differences 
between Wales, England and UK tribunals demonstrate. For example, in high-volume areas of 
administrative decision making still largely reserved to the UK (social security and 
immigration) there has been a policy of de-tribunalisation, with Government emphasising 
compulsory administrative review (reconsideration) by the initial decision-making agency and 
seeking to limit access to tribunals.114  
Where Wales is increasingly differing to England (and to reserved UK-wide matters) 
is through its investment in initial decision-making and the avoidance of disputes. This tracks 
to a Welsh fascination with what some consider to be an Australian invention, the ‘integrity’ 
branch.115 However, this has been coupled perhaps with a distinctively non-Australian 
approach to social and economic rights. Whilst the common law of England and Wales remains 
the central repository of administrative law standards, Welsh political institutions have 
expressed their commitment to human rights by legislating to develop new procedural duties 
requiring public bodies to show they have taken social, economic and inter-generational rights 
into account in their decision-making. This has combined to form a nascent rights-based 
administrative procedure law.116  
Relevant legislation begins with policy goals evidencing a strong declaration of 
political intent to promote and protect rights. However, good intentions have sometimes been 
weakened in legislative drafting, with the end result being a hybrid, or compromise between 
Government and civil society, that some have referred to as ‘bestial’ in its complexity.117 These 
legislative developments have occurred against an understandable backdrop of Government 
wishing to carve out its own constitutional identity and to promote its record on rights and 
social justice issues, whilst simultaneously insulating itself from potentially repetitive and 
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costly individual legal challenges. As such the new duties are rarely coupled with specific 
correlative rights for individuals to enforce them through legal action in a tribunal or court. 
More often the duties are to be ‘enforced’ either by ad hoc arrangements, or through a regime 
of ‘soft law’ power consisting of institutions that have various functions to review public body 
activities, make recommendations, and promote ‘right first time’ decision-making. The 
rejection of specific legally enforceable rights in Wales sometimes appears to have occurred 
more for pragmatic reasons than any concerns over the limits of legislative competence. For 
example, the Secretary of State for Wales can still intervene to prevent Bills going for Royal 
Assent if he has reasonable grounds to believe that legal divergence would have an adverse 
effect on the operation of the law as it applies in England.118 In other cases it is explicitly a 
matter of resources; such being the main argument against legal rights to use Welsh to be 
protected by a specific tribunal appeal route.  
The most ambitious example of Welsh rights and social justice based administrative 
procedure legislation is the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 (WFGA). This 
places public bodies under a duty to practice sustainable development by complying with Well-
being Goals.119 Public bodies must carry out sustainable development and must “take all 
reasonable steps” to meet their set Well-being Objectives as a means to achieving Well-being 
Goals. The word must implies a legal duty enforceable through judicial review. However, the 
broad, general and aspirational nature of the legislative objectives appears at odds with this 
form of enforcement. The Administrative Court has concluded that WFGA prescribes a high-
level target duty that is deliberately vague, general and aspirational and which applies to a class 
rather than to individuals, as such judicial review will not lie. Judicial review is also not 
available to enforce the ‘Five Ways of Working’ laid out in WFGA. The legislation states that 
public bodies must act in these Ways when carrying out sustainable development; they are; 
thinking long-term, integrating various objectives, involving people, collaboration, and 
prevention (deploying resources to prevent problems occurring or getting worse). Together 
these ‘Ways of Working’ could express some overarching requirements of administrative 
procedure, but their vagueness hampers expressly legal enforcement.  
Some would consider it significant that the judge who has so far rejected judicial review 
claims seeking to rely on WFGA is a so-called ‘judge on wheels’120 having never practiced law 
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in Wales. However, a further reason for excluding judicial review is that WFGA provides for 
other public bodies and mechanisms to police compliance with sustainability and well-being 
duties, namely integrity branch institutions, a Future Generations Commissioner and the 
Auditor General for Wales.  
The Welsh integrity landscape also includes an Older People’s Commissioner, the 
Welsh Language Commissioner and a Public Services Ombudsman for Wales (PSOW). The 
PSOW is the most long-established and wide-ranging Welsh integrity institution, appointed by 
and accountable to the Assembly. The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2019 gave the 
PSOW ‘own initiative’ powers of investigation, powers to accept oral complaints, powers over 
some private medical treatment; and a more extensive role in relation to complaints handling 
standards and procedures. This makes the PSOW one of the most influential and progressive 
of the UK Ombudsmen. Though perhaps it is a further sign of the jagged-edges of devolution 
that an argument in favour of reforming ‘statutory bars’ regulating the relationship between the 
PSOW and courts and tribunals, aiming to make redress more flexible,121 was rejected by an 
Assembly Committee on the basis that altering the relationship between Ombuds and the courts 
should only be approached on a UK-wide basis.122 The PSOW called for this issue to be 
revisited by the Commission on Justice in Wales.123 The Commission has recommended that: 
 
The Administrative Court should have the power to stay court proceedings whilst the 
Public Services Ombudsman for Wales investigates a complaint. The Ombudsman 
should have the power to refer a point of law to the Court.124 
 
The Senior President of UK, and England and Wales Tribunals also endorses a more fluid 
approach to institutional relationships between Ombuds and the tribunal judiciary.   
 Ultimately Welsh administrative procedure legislation attempts to harnesses the quasi-
political power of integrity branch institutions to incentivise systematic change, subsequently 
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perhaps reducing the need for individual legal challenges. On the contrary it could be said that 
Federal Australian Administrative Procedure law, such as the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977, is primarily about outlining specific circumstances where an 
individual can seek legal redress. This more legalised model is not without its problems, 
particularly in terms of potentially increasing the incidence of litigation focused on fine-grained 
interpretations of statutory terminology that may have little impact on improving decision-
making outcomes and administrative practices.  
In terms of how well the Welsh model of prioritising rights-based ‘right first time’ 
decision-making is working in comparison to other models, there is evidence that public 
satisfaction with Government, and with public services provision, tends to be higher than the 
UK average.125 We also know that legal claims per-head of population are lower when 
comparing Wales to other UK devolved nations, and to regions within England. For example, 
the number of judicial review applications is lower per-head of population in Wales than it is 
across various English regions.126 The number of tribunal appeals per-head of population is 
also lower in Wales, in almost all the Welsh Tribunals for which comparative data is available. 
However, low rates of judicial review and tribunal appeals could be as much due to lack of 
awareness, and limited accessibility of affordable legal advice as to the quality of Welsh 
administrative decision-making. Evidence to the Commission on Justice in Wales shows that 
cuts to legal aid funding (a non-devolved matter) have had a disproportionately negative impact 
in Wales and that the number of specialist public administrative lawyers based in Wales has 
been decreasing.127 It is revealing that the only Welsh Tribunal which has a higher rate of 
applications per-head of population than its English counterpart is the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal. This is the one tribunal where legal aid funding for advice and representation remains 
available in principle for all applicants.  
 
Policy and Oversight: Drawing the DNA Strands Together  
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Whilst we can construct a Welsh model of administrative justice, this is based on our 
interpretation of the evidence, as there is no administrative justice and tribunals policy for 
Wales. Previous research has recommended developing an administrative justice policy 
specifically drawing explicit connections between administrative justice, and issues of human 
rights, equality, good administration, nascent rights-based Welsh administrative procedure law, 
and social justice more broadly.128 This policy could also contain a presumption, as 
recommended by the Commission on Justice, that when legislating to create new public law 
duties applicable to devolved Welsh authorities, any new legal redress measures created should 
be by recourse to Welsh Tribunals.129 This would also stem the creation of ad hoc redress 
schemes, where a consistent and principled approach is lacking and there are no overarching 
standards for operation.130 Such schemes do not always give citizens a fair and independent 
system of redress131 and that they have tended to be considered as administrative processes 
rather than mechanisms for serving justice.132  
 Whilst the underpinning conceptions of administrative justice in Australia and Wales 
have their differences, it is telling that both the Australian Administrative Review Council and 
the CAJTW have been disbanded and that neither Australia or Wales currently has a specific 
body charged with oversight of its administrative justice system as a whole.133 We recommend 
greater political engagement with, and ownership of, administrative justice in Wales and the 
establishment of an oversight function either within an existing Assembly Committee (for 
starters the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee) or in a new Committee 
established for the next Assembly (from 2021) (such as a Justice Committee). Oversight must 
be by way of a statutory political committee, to ensure the bi-partisan political support essential 
to progressing administrative justice reforms, especially those involving adequate funding for 
the establishment and continued operation of new, or reformed, tribunal structures.  
 The Commission on Justice has now recommended that the Assembly should take a 
more proactive role in appropriate scrutiny of the operation of the justice system,134 and that 
further legislative devolution should be accompanied by the creation of a Justice Department 
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within Welsh Government135 and a Justice Committee within the Assembly.136 In the more 
immediate term the Commission recommends that: 
 
All public bodies, ombudsmen and other tribunals which have been established under 
Welsh law or by the Welsh Government, which make judicial or quasi-judicial 
decisions, and are not currently subject to the supervision of the President of Welsh 
Tribunals, should be brought under the supervision of the President.137 
 
More detailed thought will likely need to be given about the precise nature of this supervisory 
role, particularly for bodies which are already accountable to the Assembly or Welsh 
Government, and those which are independent such as the PSOW. 
Returning to whether the Welsh Tribunals are the nucleus containing the DNA of a 
fully devolved justice system, this conclusion seems quite a stretch. Wales is already a long 
way from having a single comprehensive system of tribunals reflecting the full extent of 
devolution. A more comprehensive system could be arranged around broad areas including; 
planning and environment, land and tax, education, public administration (including local 
government), housing, health and social welfare and Welsh language rights.  
Having some (administrative) justice functions has likely led to more Welsh 
Government insight and awareness into the operation of a justice system, including matters of 
constitutional principle as well as more pragmatic resource implications. The requirements to 
make provision for more impartial relationships between policy departments and tribunals, and 
the WTU and the Welsh Government itself, is significant for an administration where justice 
is mostly not a devolved responsibility. Welsh Government and the Assembly have often had 
to undertake these reforms within the constitutional confines of various unsatisfactory 
devolution settlements that continue to struggle with positioning the administration of justice. 
It is then less surprising that workable mechanisms have had to be fashioned through 
administrative arrangements, and by deploying administrative justice in its broadest sense to 
include a range of integrity branch institutions.  
A new buzz word in UK administrative justice, recently coined by Sir Ernest Ryder 
Senior President of Tribunals, is ‘interoperability’. This has a range of dimensions, one of 
which is cross-deployment of tribunal judges across at least three of the four UK nations. Cross-
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deployment between tribunals both within and across territorial and subject-matter boundaries 
is built into the Wales Act 2017. For example, with Welsh Tribunal judges deployed to English 
Property Tribunals. The Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 contains similar foundations that could 
see the territorial cross-deployment of Scottish Tribunal judges. Another dimension of 
‘interoperability’ is in co-operation and shared services between devolved and reserved 
tribunals, with the opening of a new joint tribunal centre in Glasgow being seen as a positive 
example.138  
In these dimensions interoperability advances Leggatt’s earlier reflections on the need 
for improved cross-border co-operation.139 This encapsulates an evolving relationship between 
administrative justice systems where there is a more fluid relationship across UK jurisdictions. 
This development should be followed closely, particularly in terms of how efficiency and 
effectiveness for users can be improved through shared services, and consistency of judicial 
and administrative standards. Interoperability will have to respect the asymmetrical 
constitutional context and allow room for the autonomy of each government. For example, 
there are already some concerns the cross-deployment is being used to deploy ‘English’ judges 
into Welsh Tribunal cases, seemingly contrary to the initial impetus for the practice as designed 
to increase opportunities for Welsh judges to sit, making a career in the Welsh Tribunal 
judiciary a more feasible and attractive prospect.  
A further dimension of interoperability is the relationship between bodies in the 
administrative justice system, with the Senior President of Tribunals specifically encouraging 
joint working between Ombuds and tribunals including developing joint training and liaison. 
Such engagement should be sought as a means to share skills, learning, and good practice 
across administrative justice systems,140 and could be more swiftly and effectively progressed 
in Wales given its comparatively smaller size.  
Whether or not the Welsh Tribunals contain the DNA for a broader justice system, the 
context of their development helps demonstrate that traditional court, and court equivalent 
structures, and largely paper-based and adversarial models, are not optimum means for 
delivering administrative justice in the 21st Century. A more successful approach is likely to 
involve flexible interactions (interoperability) between a range of institutions, both within and 
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across jurisdictional boundaries, whether these be territorial boundaries, or boundaries of 
traditionally perceived procedures and expertise.  
